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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
DAVID HITTLE, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20020504-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found the trial court committed plain error 
as a matter of law when the trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 by not 
advising Hittle of his right to a speedy trial? 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that because Hittle was not advised of 
his substantial constitutional right to a speedy trial, his plea was not knowing or 
voluntary and thus harmful? 
"On certiorari review, 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion 
of the [trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f 10, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. That 
decision is then reviewed for correctness. Id" State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, 17, 
467 Utah Adv. Rep.3; State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 16, 57 P.3d 1052. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 is relevant to the issues on 
appeal and is attached in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
David Hittle's conviction for criminal non-support, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (R. 44-46), was reversed by the Court of 
Appeals and the State appeals. State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 47 P.3d 101. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
David Hittle was charged by information filed in Third District Court on April 
10, 2000, with criminal non-support, a Class A misdemeanor and a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (R. 44-46). 
On April 20, 2000, Hittle pleaded guilty to the class A misdemeanor charge, 
agreed to pay all child support arrearages, and agreed to 36 months probation (R. 56; 
139: 1-2). However, during the Rule 11 colloquy, the trial court failed to inform Hittle 
of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court stated the following: 
Do you understand that by entering this plea today . . . you are giving up your 
right to go to trial; [your] right to confront and cross examine witnesses, to 
present evidence on your behalf or to refrain from presenting evidence if you [] 
wish and to make the State carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt 
all of the elements of the offense as charged; to have witnesses brought on your 
behalf to court to testify, with the compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You 
have the right not to commit yourself unless you choose to take the stand in 
which case you would be subject to cross examination. You have the right to, if 
you were to be convicted and found guilty following a trial by an impartial 
decision maker, or a jury in this matter, you would have the right to appeal. 
You're giving up those rights by entering this plea today. 
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, f 2. At the change of plea hearing, Hittle executed a written 
statement he understood these rights he was waving, although the Plea Agreement 
Hittle signed did not include a provision waiving the right to a speedy trial (R. 56; 139: 
21-22). That statement was incorporated into the record at the change of plea hearing 
(R. 139: 21-22). 
On May 17, 2000, Hittle filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 
62-62). The trial court denied the motion (R. 110), and Hittle appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals (R. 110; 116). 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court 
committed plain error by failing to advise Hittle of his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial and that this error was harmful because "if the defendant is not fully informed of 
his rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary." Hittle, 
2002 UT App 134, f f 6, 10. The Court of Appeals did not reach other issues Hittle 
raised, such as other omissions under Rule 11 and ineffective assistance of counsel. Id, 
at1 l ,n . l . 
On October 23, 2002, this Court granted the State's petition for certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Hittle was ordered to pay $275 per month child support for his daughter under a 
divorce decree (R. 44-46). Between February 1, 1997, and April 5, 2000, Hittle failed 
to fully pay total child support (R. 46). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals' decision correctly held that a trial court must comply with 
Rule 11 and advise defendants of their constitutional right to a speedy trial before a 
guilty plea can be accepted. 
In this case, Rule 11 requirements were not satisfied where the trial court utterly 
failed to advise Hittle of his right to a speedy jury trial. Therefore, Hittle's plea 
agreement could not have been knowing or voluntary because the record is clear that 
the Hittle was not informed of this substantial constitutional right. This error was 
obvious because precedence and Rule 11 specifically requires defendants to be informed 
of all their rights before a guilty plea can be taken. 
The Court of Appeals was correct to presume that Hittle was prejudiced by a 
Rule 11 violation because the record is clear that Hittle was not informed of his right to 
a speedy trial. Because Hittle was not advised of this substantial constitutional right as 
required by Rule 11, this Court should presume harm. 
In the alternative, if this Court reverses, Hittle asks this Court to remand to the 
Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues Hittle raised before that court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A 
DEFENDANT MUST BE INFORMED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE HE CAN WAIVE THIS 
RIGHT AND BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN ACCEPT HIS 
GUILTY PLEA 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that a trial court must strictly comply with 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 and thus followed this Court's precedent in 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991), by requiring trial courts to "not accept a 
guilty plea until it finds that the defendant knows that by pleading guilty, he is waiving 
'the right to a speedy public trial.'" State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, 1 6, 47 P.3d 
101, (citing Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e)(3)). Hittle was not informed 
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial either orally or in the plea affidavit. Hittle, 
2002 UT App 134, at 1 6. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically require trial courts to refuse a 
plea of guilty until the court has found "the plea is voluntarily made" and "the 
defendant knows of the r igh t . . . to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury." 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e). The Court of Appeals' decision is 
correct because it follows this Court's precedence which requires a trial court to strictly 
comply with Rule 11 when taking a guilty plea. 
A. The Court of Appeals' Decision Follows This Court's Precedence For 
Rule 11 Strict Compliance 
The Court of Appeals reviewed both the oral colloquy and plea affidavit and 
found that neither advised Hittle of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Hittle, 2002 
UT App 134, at f 6. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found that this was plain and 
obvious error. Id. 
This Court has placed the responsibility for establishing strict compliance with 
all constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements squarely on the trial court. State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311, 1313 (Utah 1987). 
In elucidating this requirement, this Court stated in State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 
216 (Utah 1991), that this requirement may be fulfilled by "multiple means, e.g., 
transcript of the oral colloquy between the court and defendant, contents of a written 
affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood, and acknowledged by defendant 
and the court, contents of other documents such as the information, presentence 
reports, exhibits, etc., similarly incorporated into the record, and so on." Id. at 218. 
This Court further stated: 
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 compliance be demonstrated on the 
record at the time the ... plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit is used to aid 
Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea hearing.... Then the 
affidavit itself ... can be incorporated into the record. The efficiency-promoting 
function of the affidavit is thereby served, in that the court need not repeat, 
verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed and answered in the affidavit. 
Id. at 217; (citing State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)). In an attempt to further clarify the strict compliance test, 
this Court explained that "strict compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so 
long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the 
requirements ha[ve] been fulfilled." Id. 
Thus, strict compliance requires trial courts to "personally establish that the 
defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that 
the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional right[]" to a speedy trial. See 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 1 11, P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 
995 (Utah 1993)) (emphasis in original). 
In this case, the State wrests the Court of Appeals' decision by claiming it 
requires "a rote recitation of all the rule 11 requirements in the colloquy and the 
affidavit before it will find that a court has strictly complied with rule 11" (Brief of 
Petitioner at 7). The State is incorrect and misinterprets the Court of Appeals' decision 
in Hittle. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals relied on Maguire and precedence outlined in 
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, 5 P.3d 1222, in finding that the trial court did 
not strictly comply with Rule 11 because it utterly failed to advise Hittle of his right to 
a speedy trial. See Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at f 6. 
Maguire specifically rejected the idea that "rote recitation of all the Rule 11 
elements" must be orally stated during the plea colloquy. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218, 
n.2. Moreover, Maguire allows "strict compliance" to be satisfied by "multiple 
means." Id, at 217. 
The Court of Appeals not only reviewed the plea colloquy in finding that the trial 
court failed to inform Hittle of his right to a speedy trial, but it also reviewed the plea 
agreement. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at 1 2. This Court specifically endorsed this 
course of action, where both the plea colloquy and plea agreement should be reviewed 
to determine whether a defendant's waiver was voluntary and knowing. See Maguire, 
830 P.2d at 217-18. 
The State claims that the Court of Appeals failed to look at "the relevance of any 
other record factors which may have had a bearing on the substantive goal or rule 11." 
(Brief of Petitioner at 9). However, the State fails to offer any evidence that Hittle was 
informed in any other manner of his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the State even 
fails to show that Hittle knew or understood this right. 
In arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to look at other relevant factors, the 
State is forced to rely on the claim that the trial judge "took extreme care in making his 
determination that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary," (Brief of 
Petitioner at 9), because there is nothing in the record that shows that Hittle was 
informed of his right to a speedy trial. The record shows that Hittle was unsure about 
taking a guilty plea and therefore the trial judge wanted to make sure Hittle understood 
what he was doing (R. 140:3). However, the record is clear that Hittle was never 
informed of his right to a speedy trial; therefore Hittle could not have knowingly or 
voluntarily waived that right. 
Moreover, the State's claim misconstrues the "strict compliance" test clarified in 
Maguire. While Maguire and other precedence allow a knowing and voluntary waiver 
to be satisfied by "multiple means," it is clear that the record must reflect that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived each right. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, at \ 
11; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. The Court of Appeals' 
decision clearly does not hold, as argued by the state, that rote recitation of Rule 11 is 
now required by trial courts when taking guilty pleas; the decision merely follows this 
Court's precedence that defendants must be informed of constitutional and Rule 11 
rights before a knowing and voluntary plea can be taken and that the record must reflect 
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights. It is equally clear 
that the right to a speedy trial is both a constitutional and Rule 11 right, and Hittle was 
not informed of this right as this Court has previously required. 
B. Precedence and Rule 11 Requires Trial Courts to Inform Defendants 
of Their Right to A Speedy Trial By Jury Before the Taking of a 
Guilty Plea. 
The State maintains that a defendant does not need to be informed of his right to 
a speedy trial before entering a guilty plea and before this right can be knowingly and 
voluntarily waived (Brief of Petitioner at 10). The State's position is completely 
contradictory to Rule 11 requirements as interpretated by this Court. 
Rule 11 specifically requires trial courts to make sure a defendant's plea of guilty 
is knowing and voluntarily made and that the defendant knows of "the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e). 
Rule 11(e)(3) clearly outlines two substantial rights: a right to a speedy trial by jury and 
a right to trial by an impartial jury. As outlined above, this Court requires strict 
compliance with Rule 11, although this does not necessarily mean rote recitation of the 
rights listed. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, at \ 11. 
However, Visser certainly cannot mean that trial courts are no longer required to 
inform defendants of their substantial constitutional rights. Clearly the right to a 
speedy trial is substantial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury...." Further, Rule 11 requires the same as the Sixth 
Amendment. The constitutional right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal 
defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an impartial jury. See United States 
Constitution, Amendment IV; see also Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e). 
The whole purpose in requiring trial courts to make sure defendants understand 
and know the rights they are waiving when pleading guilty to a crime will only be 
frustrated if this Court accepts the State's argument. To claim that as long as a 
defendant is informed of his "right to trial" completely satisfies Rule 11 is inconsistent 
with the plain and ordinary meaning of "the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury." Hittle was guaranteed both the right to a speedy trial and the right to 
trial before an impartial jury under Rule 11(e) and he was not informed of his separate 
and distinct right to a speedy trail. It was impossible for Hittle to knowingly and 
voluntarily waive a right which the record shows the trial court never informed him 
about. Rule 11(e) requires defendants to be informed of both rights. While trial courts 
may not be required to specifically state the word "speedy," surely a defendant must be 
aware that he has a right to a trial in the near future compared to a right to trial at some 
future time.^  The fact that trial courts are not required to recite Rule 11(e) verbatim in 
no way takes away from the requirement that defendants must understand these rights 
before they can be knowingly and voluntarily waived. The record is abundantly clear 
that the trial court completely failed to inform Hittle of his right to a speedy trial; thus 
the record is absent any evidence that Hittle knowingly and voluntarily waived this 
right. 
The State asserts that Hittle is inconsistent with State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 
26 P.3d 203, and by implication overrules Hittle (Brief of Petitioner at 10). In 
Martinez, this Court concluded that a trial court strictly complied with Rule 11 by 
informing the defendant about "the right to a jury trial." Id. at \ 22-25. There is no 
suggestion that the trial court used the terms "impartial" and "speedy," yet this Court 
held that the trial court colloquy "strictly complied" with Rule 11. Id. However, 
nothing in Martinez suggests that the trial court did not use these terms in the plea 
colloquy. Id. Moreover, whether the rights these terms convey were communicated to 
the defendant in Martinez was not an issue before the court in that case. See Id. 
Therefore, Martinez does not control and is not dispositive. 
C. The Trial Court's Error Was Obvious 
Hittle asserts that the trial court's error was obvious because Rule 11(e) requires 
trial courts to inform defendants of the right to a speedy trial. "To show obviousness 
of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of trial." State v. 
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 16, 18 P.3d 1123; see also State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 
239 (Utah App. 1997). Hittle further asserts that case law is abundantly clear that Rule 
11(e) must be strictly complied with. 
The trial court had the guidance of State v. Visser (Visser I), 1999 UT App 19, 
973 P.2d 988, rev'd on other grounds by State v. Visser {Visser II), 2002 UT 88, 22 
P.3d 1242. In Visser I, the Court of Appeals held strict compliance with Rule 11 
required that a trial court specifically inform the defendant of his right to a speedy trial 
before an impartial jury. Id. at Vi 16-18. Although this Court reversed that decision in 
Visser II, Visser I was reversed not because a defendant is not entitled to be informed of 
his right to a speedy trial, but because the record in that case reflected that the 
defendant had in fact been informed of his rights. See Visser II, at \ 13. 
Moreover, although this Court has not specifically addressed this precise issue, 
the Court of Appeals outlined in Tarnawiecki that "strict compliance, rather than 
substantial compliance, with Rule 11 is required when accepting a guilty plea." 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at f 12. It is obvious that the trial court did not have 
the benefit of Tarnawiecki at the time Hittle's plea was entered; however, this Court 
has specifically adopted a "strict compliance" test which superseded the "record as a 
whole" test. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; see also Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18. 
Moreover, Maguire specifically stated that "no requirement" of Rule 11 may be 
omitted. Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218. Thus, the trial court had access to this Court's 
opinions which are binding and declare that trial courts must abide by all Rule 11(e) 
requirements. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INFORM HITTLE OF HIS 
SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY JURY 
TRIAL WAS OBVIOUS PLAIN ERROR THAT PREJUDICED 
HITTLE 
The record is abundantly clear that Hittle was not informed of his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial as required by Rule 11(e). Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, at f 2. 
This error was harmful because the omission dealt with a substantial constitutional 
right. 
The Court of Appeals presumed Hittle was harmed by the trial court's omission 
because "by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot 
make a folly informed decision." Id. at f 10, see also State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 
t 25, 996 P.2d 1065. 
Hittle did not object to the trial court's omissions under Rule 11, so the Court of 
Appeals reviewed his claim for plain error. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, at \ 5. Because 
this issue was first raised on appeal, Hittle could not show on the record how not 
knowing about his right to a speedy jury trial affected his decision to enter a guilty 
plea. 
The Court of Appeals has determined that when a trial court fails to advise 
defendant of his substantial constitutional rights under Rule 11, the omission is 
presumed harmful. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at t 18 (presuming harm when 
trial court failed to inform defendant that she was entitled to a "speedy trial before an 
impartial jury"); see also Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, t1 25-26 (presuming harm where 
trial court failed to inform defendant that he would waive certain constitutional rights 
by pleading guilty). 
Because Hittle first raised this issue on appeal, and considering that the trial 
court failed to advise him of his substantial constitutional right to a speedy trial, it was 
virtually impossible for Hittle to show by the record that he was prejudiced by the trial 
court for failing to advise him of this right. Again, the record is clear that Hittle was 
not advised of this right, thus the record cannot show that Hittle voluntarily and 
knowingly waived this right. 
The State asserts that Hittle should be required to show that but for the trial 
court's error, there is a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty (Brief 
of Petitioner at 13-18). But under the circumstances of this case, it is nearly impossible 
for Hittle (or any other defendant who has not been advised of substantial constitutional 
rights) to show that but for this error, he would not have pleaded guilty. The only way 
Hittle could show that he was prejudiced is to point out in the record something to the 
effect that shows he was concerned about having to face a jury trial at some distant 
point in the future, and he only plead guilty to avoid this uncertain future trial date. 
Almost certainly, if Hittle expressed this concern at any point during the plea hearing, 
the trial court would have certainly advised him of his right to a speedy trial and thus 
avoided the whole problem. The problem is that there is no evidence that Hittle knew 
or understood of his right to a speedy trial and because there is no evidence of this, 
there is no reason to presume that Hittle or any other defendant in his position would 
express hope or a desire for such a right. By not knowing what rights he was waiving, 
Hittle could not have made a fully informed decision when entering his guilty plea. 
The only course of action considering these facts is to presume harm when a defendant 
is not advised of a substantial constitutional right as important as this. Otherwise, how 
is justice served by accepting an involuntary guilty plea while defendants do not even 
know their rights? 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Hittle asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' 
decision that a trial court must advise defendants of all substantial constitutional rights 
outlined in Rule 11, including the right to a speedy trial, before a guilty plea can be 
entered. In the alternative, should this Court reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, 
Hittle asks this Court to remand the other issues the Court of Appeals did not reach in 
Hittle. See Visserll, at \ 17. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of June, 2003. 
^n/^^y l^o 
Margaret P. -Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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^ 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Hi Defendant David Hittle appeals his conviction and the trial 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because 
the trial court failed to advise Defendant of his right to a 
speedy trial under Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. While conceding that the trial court failed to 
advise Defendant of his right to a speedy trial under rule 
LI (e)(3), the State argues that the error was harmless because 
Defendant has failed to show that but for the trial court's 
amission, he would have proceeded to trial. We reverse. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court committed other 
missions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
nd that his trial counsel was ineffective. Since we reverse on 
he ground that the trial court failed to inform Defendant of his 
ight to a speedy trial, we do not address these other issues 
BACKGROUND 
%2 Defendant was charged with a third degree felony and a class 
A misdemeanor- for criminal non-support, m violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). During a hearing in April 2000, 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the class A misdemeanor, agreed to 
pay all child support arrearages, and agreed to 3 6 months 
probation m exchange for the State dropping the felony charge 
and the trial court suspending his one year jail sentence. 
However, during the rule 11 colloquy, the trial court failed to 
inform Defendant of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court 
stated the following: 
Do" you understand that by entering this plea 
today . . . you are giving up your right to 
go to trial; [your] right to confront and 
cross examine witnesses, to present evidence 
on your behalf or to refrain from presenting 
evidence if you {] wish and to make the State 
carry the burden of proving beyond reasonable 
doubt all of the elements of the offense as 
charged; to have witnesses brought on your 
behalf to court to testify, with the 
compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You 
have the right not to commit yourself unless 
you choose to take the stand m which case 
you would be subject to cross examination. 
You have the right to, if you were to be 
convicted and found guilty following a trial 
by an impartial decision maker, or a jury in 
this matter, you would have the right to 
appeal. You're giving up those rights by 
entering this plea today. 
Defendant stated that he was prepared to give up those rights and 
agreed that he understood the potential penalties for pleading 
guilty to a class A misdemeanor. Furthermore, the Plea Agreement 
Defendant signed did not include a provision waiving the right to 
a -speedy trial. 
%3 On May 17, 20 0 0, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal 
followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1[4 Because Defendant did not object below to the trial court's 
omissions under rule 11, we review Defendant's claim for plain 
error. We determine whether the trial court committed plain 
error as a matter of law. See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 821 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
f5 Since Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the 
trial court failed to inform him of his right to a speedy trial, 
Defendant must show plain error. See State v. Garcia, 2001 UT 
App 19,1(6, 18 P. 3d 1123, M 'To succeed on a claim of plain error, 
a defendant has the burden of showing (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) 
che error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful,1" State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 
186,1(11, 5 P.'3d 1222 {citations and internal quotations omitted) 
(alteration in original) . "To show obviousness of the error, 
[Defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19 at ^6; see also State v. Ross, 
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that a trial court' s error is not plain where 
there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court."). 
Our review of Defendant's claim under each element of plain error 
analysis is set forth below. 
%6 First, the trial court erred by failing to advise Defendant 
of his right to a speedy trial. Under Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not accept a 
guilty plea until it finds that the defendant knows that by 
pleading guilty, he is waiving "the right to a speedy public 
trial." In analyzing alleged rule 11 violations, we have held 
Lhat "strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with 
^ule 11 is reqiired when accepting a guilty plea." Tarnawiecki, 
2000 UT App 186 at fl2 (emphasis added); see also State v. 
laguire, 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991). The trial court did not 
strictly comply with rule 11 because it failed to advise 
Defendant of his right to a speedy trial either orally or in the 
Dlea affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred. 
I7 Second, this error should have been obvious to the trial 
:ourt in light of our opinion in Tarnawiecki. In Tarnawiecki, 
:he trial court failed to notify the defendant of her right "to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury" pursuant to rule 11. 2000 
JT App 186 at Kl6. Because the defendant raised the issue for 
:he first time on appeal, we applied a plain error analysis and 
leld that the trial court's omission was an obvious error. See 
-d. at Ul8. We reasoned that in light of Utah appellate court 
)pinions requiring strict compliance with the rule 11 colloquy 
requirements, the trial court should have known that failing to 
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inform the defendant of her right to a "speedy trial before an 
impartial jury" was error. Id at Hl9. Therefore, like 
Tarnawiecki, the trial court's failure to inform Defendant of his 
right to a speedy trial was an obvious error. 
1J8 The State argues that the alleged error was not obvious 
because Tarnawiecki is distinguishable from Defendant's case. In 
Tarnawiecki, the trial court "wholly failed to advise [the] 
defendant of her constitutional right to a speedy trial before an 
impartial jury." Id. at 1l7. However, in Defendant's case, the 
trial court omitted only the word "speedy" from the required rule 
11 colloquy. Since the trial court complied with the requirements 
of Tarnawiecki, with the exception of the word "speedy," the 
State argues that the error was not obvious. However, because 
"strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with Rule 
11 is required when accepting a guilty plea," the State's 
argument fails. Id. at 1l2. Furthermore, the constitutional 
right to a speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal 
defendants, separate from the right to a trial before an 
impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI. Thus, a defendant 
must be informed of this right and knowingly waive it in order to 
enter a valid guilty plea. 
%9 Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the 
omission dealt with a substantial constitutional right. See id. 
It is well established under Utah law that we will presume harm 
under plain error analysis when a trial court fails to inform ~a 
defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g., 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at Hl8 {presuming harm when trial 
court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a 
"speedy trial before an impartial jury"); State v. Ostler, 2000 
UT App 28,111(25-26, 996 P. 2d 1065 {presuming harm where trial 
court failed to inform defendant that he would waive certain 
constitutional rights by pleading guilty); State v. Pharris, 798 
P.2d 772, 774 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same). 
UlQ The reason for presuming harm is that by not knowing which 
rights a defendant is waiving, the defendant cannot make a fully 
informed decision. £e£ Ostler, 2000 UT App 28 .at J25. If the 
defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to pleading 
guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. See id. We 
cannot accept an involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have 
done justice. Therefore, because the trial court failed to 
advise Defendant of his substantial constitutional right to a 
speedy trial, we presume harm. 
CONCLUSION 
til Because the trial court committed plain error in advising 
Defendant of his rights, we reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
William A. Thorne Jr.,/Judge 
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419 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
Cross-References — Harmless error, Rights of accused, Utah. Const , Art I, §§ 7 to 
U R C r P 30 13, § 77 1 6 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional time to plead given time to plead to such information, court 
Waiver of objections committed reversible error State v Jensen, 83 
Utah 452, 30 P2d 203 (1934) 
Addi t iona l t i m e to p l e a d . 
Where original information did not state pub Waiver of ob jec t ions . 
he offense and was amended so as to s ta te Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general 
public offense for first time, as amending infor- legal rule that all objections, including those to 
mation m larceny prosecution so as to allege proceedings in the circuit court, must be made 
ownership of property alleged to have been before a guilty plea is entered or the objections 
stolen, it was equivalent of a new information will be waived State v Humphrey, 794 P 2d 496 
requiring arraignment of defendant and his (Utah Ct App 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 
plea thereto, and where defendant was not 823 P 2d 464 (Utah 1991) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Ain.Jur .2dL —21Arn Jur 2d Cr iminalLaw C.J .S . — 22 C J S Criminal Law § 355 e t 
§ 589 et seq seq. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infection, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. T h e 
defendant shall not be required to plead unti l the defendant has had a 
reasonable tune to confer with counsel 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insani ty If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for a n 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a writ ten demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea unt i l the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she ha s know-
ingly waived the r ight to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the r ight to the presumption of innocence, t h e 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public t r ial 
before an impartial j u r y t he right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and tha t by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant unders tands the na tu re and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, tha t upon trial the prosecution would have t h e 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and t h a t 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if i t 
establishes tha t the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit pulpability, tha t t he 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the min imum and maximum sentencey and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory na tu re of the Trrmirrmrn sentence, t h a t 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
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(e)(6) if the tendered plea Is a result of a prior plea discussion and pl e a 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised tha t the right of appeal is limited 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a writ ten statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established tha t the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement If the defendant cannot unders tand the English 
language, it will be sufficient tha t the s tatement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally tha t any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentat ive agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the t ime for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides tha t final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mental ly ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment , to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tr ial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to wi thdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hear ing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-
ber 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.) 
Advisory Committee N o t e . — These 
amendments are intended to reflect current law 
without any substantive changes. The addition 
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis 
in section (e)(4)(B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and 
is in accordance with prior case law. E.g. State 
v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The 
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
16Q, 27 LJEd.2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the 
factual basis required for those pleas. E.g. 
WiUett v. Barnes, 842 R2d 860 (Utah 1992). 
The amendments exphcitly recognize tha t 
plea affidavits, where used, m a y properly be 
incorporated into the record when the tr ial 
Court de temunes tha t the defendant has read 
(or been read) the affidavit, unders tands its 
contents, and acknowledges the contents. State 
v. Maguire, 830 E 2 d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper 
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the 
court time, eliminate some of the monotony of 
rote recitations of r ights waived by pleading 
guilty, and allow a more focused and probing 
inquiry into the facts of the offense, the rela-
tionship of the law to those facts, and whether 
the plea is knowingly and voluntari ly entered. 
These benefits a re contingent on a careful and 
considered review of the affidavit by the defen-
dant and proper care by the tr ial court to verify 
tha t such a review has actually occurred. 
